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NOTE
SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY TO THIRD
PARTIES FOR THE ACTS OF
INTOXICATED ADULT GUESTS:
KELLY v. GWINNELL
ONALD Gwinnell consumed several drinks while at the home of
the Joseph Zaks. Gwinnell left the Zaks' home shortly before 9:00
p.m. and was involved in a head-on collision while driving home.'
The collision seriously injured the driver of the other car, Marie E. Kelly.
Kelly sued Gwinnell and, under a respondeat superior theory, Gwinnell's
employer. 2 Gwinnell and his employer sued the Zaks in a third-party action.
Kelly later amended her complaint to name the Zaks as primary defendants.
The Zaks obtained a summary judgment on the grounds that, as a matter of
law, a social host is not liable to third parties for the negligent acts of an
adult guest who has become intoxicated at the host's home. The New Jersey
Appellate Division affirmed, holding that a social host who has furnished
alcoholic beverages to an adult is not liable for damages resulting from the
guest's intoxication. 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court granted a petition for
certification. Held, reversed: When a social host provides the means of intoxication to an adult guest, the host may be liable for any damages to third
parties resulting from the guest's subsequent drunken driving. Kelly v.
Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
1. According to Gwinnell and the Zaks, Gwinnell consumed two or three drinks during
his stay. A later blood test indicated that Gwinnell's blood alcohol concentration was 0.286%.
Under present New Jersey law, a person who drives with a blood alcohol percentage of 0.10 or
more is guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50
(West Supp. 1984-1985). According to expert testimony, Gwinnell's blood alcohol level indicated that he had not consumed two or three drinks, but, rather, the equivalent of 13 drinks,
and that Gwinnell would have shown obvious signs of intoxication.
2. Gwinnell was employed by Paragon Corporation, the owner of the vehicle that Gwinnell was driving. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior an employer can be liable for the
acts of his employee. 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 417 (1970).
3. The appellate division noted that no other jurisdiction in the United States had
adopted the precise cause of action that Kelly had asserted. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 N.J. Super.
320, 463 A.2d 387, 390-91 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983); see Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d 528, 536-40
(1980). A New Jersey trial court, however, had in 1982 recognized social host liability to a
third person for the acts of an intoxicated adult guest. Figuly v. Knoll, 185 N.J. Super. 477,
449 A.2d 564, 565 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982). Furthermore, the appellate division in Gwinnell stated that the social host could be liable when the guest was a minor. 463 A.2d at 388;
accord Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15, 17-18 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
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THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY

The common law recognized no cause of action against a commercial or
social host for injuries to third persons caused by the host's intoxicated patrons or guests. 4 The rationale behind the common law rule was that the
voluntary consumption of alcohol, rather than the mere furnishing of alcohol, was the proximate cause of any subsequent injury. 5 A state legislature's
6
enactment of a dram shop act created an exception to the common law rule.
Dram shop acts impose strict civil liability on furnishers of alcohol for
injuries or damages caused by intoxicated persons served with alcohol in
dram shops. 7 Dram shop acts usually have been narrowly construed in the
jurisdictions that adopted them. 8 As a result, the acts have been applied
only against commercial suppliers of intoxicating beverages. 9 Courts in two
jurisdictions, Minnesota and Iowa, have attempted to extend dram shop lia4. Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wash. App. 84, 678 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1984). The Halligan court
cited Halvorsen v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897, 899 (1969), in which
30 AM. JUR. Intoxicating Liquors §§ 520-521 (1958) was quoted with approval: "[I]t
is not a
tort to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to ordinary able-bodied men, and . . . in the
absence of statute, there can be no cause of action against one furnishing liquor in favor of
those injured by the intoxication of the person so furnished ....
" Accord Cole v. Rush, 45
Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450, 457 (1955); Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill.
311, 83 N.E.2d 708, 712-13
(1949); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847, 851 (1966); Cowman v. Hansen, 250
Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682, 687 (1958); see also Comment, Civil Liabilityfor FurnishingLiquor
in California, 5 PAC. L.J. 186, 187 (1974) (discussing common law rule).
5. See Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 158-59, 486 P.2d 151, 155, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627
(1971), for a compilation of case citations and the explanation of the rationale supporting the
common law rule; see also Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450, 457 (1955) (supporting
the common law rule). See generally Annot., 75 A.L.R.2D 833, 835 (1961); Annot., 130
A.L.R. 352, 357 (1941); 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969) (all stating and
explaining the background of the common law rule).
6. Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wash. App. 84, 678 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1984) (quoting 30 AM.
JUR. Intoxicating Liquors §§ 520-521 (1958)):
It is generally held that there can be no cause of action against one furnishing
liquor in favor of those injured by the intoxication of the person so furnished
even though the liquor was sold or given to one in violation of a law other than
under a [dram shop] act ....
7. Graham, Liability of the Social Hostfor Injuries Caused by the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 16 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 561, 563-64 (1980). A dram shop is a "place where
spiritous liquors are sold by the dram or drink; a barroom." WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 782 (2d ed. 1951). Dram shop acts are often called civil damage acts. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-102 (1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.730 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 311-2 (1976).
8. Only 16 states currently have dram shop acts: ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-102 (West 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 713 (1975); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 19841985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (West 1965); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22
(West 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11101 (McKinney 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01
(Page 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.730 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-11-2 (1976); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 176.35 (West Supp. 1979-1980); WYO.STAT.
§ 12-5-502 (Supp. 1977).
9. Graham, supra note 7, at 564-66; Note, Extension of the Dram Shop Act.- New Found
Liability of the Social Host, 49 N.D.L. REV. 67, 72-74 (1972); see, e.g., Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill.
App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1048 (1981); Behnke v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App. 219, 175
N.W.2d 303, 303"04 (1970); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551-52 (Sup.
Ct. 1975), aft'd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976).
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bility to social hosts.10 The legislatures of those jurisdictions reacted to this
extension, however, by amending the statutes, making them applicable only
to commercial sellers.II The remaining jurisdictions that have enacted dram
shop acts disallow social host liability under the statutes.' 2 Although New
Jersey had a dram shop act during prohibition, the act was repealed when

prohibition ended in 1934.13 At the time of Gwinnell's accident, therefore, a
dram shop act was not in force.
Prior to 1959 no court had directly attacked the common law rule of nonliability
or attempted to establish an area of common law dram shop liability.14 Many courts, however, had begun to reevaluate the common law rule
of nonliability in light of the developing premise that the serving of liquor
initiated a foreseeable chain of events for which commercial suppliers of alcohol might be held liable.' 5 These courts looked beyond the common law
rule that the consumption of alcohol was the proximate cause of any subsequent injury resulting from intoxication and instead focused on the pro16
vider's foreseeability of injury to or by the consumer of alcohol.
10. Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614, 615-16 (Iowa 1972); Ross v. Ross, 294
Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149, 152-53 (1972); see also Graham, supra note 7, at 566-67 (emphasizing decisions departing from traditional interpretations of dram shop acts); Note, California
Finds Social Host Can Be Liable to Third Partiesfor Intoxicated Guests' Negligent Acts-Coulter v. Superior Court, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 945, 954 (1979) (dram shop acts form basis for
liability). The Minnesota Supreme Court applied MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West 1972) to
a social host and stated that the purpose of this dram shop act was to impose liability on
"every violator whether in the liquor business or not." Ross v. Ross, 200 N.W.2d at 152-53.
The Iowa court has applied IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (West 1949) to a social host by interpreting the act's scope of liability against "any person" who sells or gives liquor under the
dram shop act as including the social host. Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d at 615-16.
11. In Minnesota the dram shop act was amended by removing the word "giving," making the statute clearly applicable only to sellers of alcoholic beverages and not to social hosts.
Graham, supra note 7, at 568; see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1980). The Iowa
legislature repealed the portion of the statute referring to "any person," which the court in
Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614, 615-16 (Iowa 1972), had interpreted as extending the
act to the social host. Graham, supra note 7, at 568; see IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West
Supp. 1984-1985).
12. See, e.g., DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Co., 378 So. 2d 733, 734 (Ala. 1979) (dram shop act
has no application absent sale of alcohol); Heldt v. Brei, 118 Ill. App. 3d 798, 455 N.E.2d 842,
844 (1983) (dram shop act has no application since social host not in business of selling liquor);
Behnke v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App. 219, 175 N.W.2d 303, 304 (1970) (dram shop act not applicable to social host).
13. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959). When New Jersey's dram
shop act was repealed in 1934, it was replaced by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1-1 to :4-1 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
14. Holden, Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County and its Legislative Abrogation: The Common Law Liability of the Social Host, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 612, 616-17 (1979).
15. Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358, 359 (1969) (court chose
not to follow jurisdictions that had judicially abrogated common law rule); see Pratt v. Daly,
55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147, 148-50 (1940) (commercial supplier of alcohol negligent in selling
alcohol to known drunkard); Nally v. Blandford, 291 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956)
(liquor licensee negligent in selling whiskey to customer who boasted he would drink entire
quart of whiskey without stopping, did so, and died); Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Or. 92, 35 P.2d
672, 680 (1934) (noncommercial defendant negligent for inducing woman to drink alcohol to
point of death); McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168, 170-71 (1883) (tavern keeper negligent for allowing patron to drink until he died).
16. Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Or. 92, 35 P.2d 672, 677-78 (1934); McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex.
168, 170 (1883).
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In 1959 the New Jersey Supreme Court became the first state court to
abrogate expressly the common law rule of nonliability, reasoning in Rappaport v. Nichols' 7 that personal injury was an eminently foreseeable consequence of serving an intoxicated customer more liquor. The court's decision
in Rappaport became the landmark case on common law dram shop liability. 18 In Rappaport the sale of liquor to a minor caused his intoxication and
subsequent death in an automobile accident. The minor's wife brought a
wrongful death action against the tavern owner who sold the liquor to the
decedent. The Rappaport court held that serving alcohol to an intoxicated
minor constituted negligence. 19 Such an act created an unreasonable risk of
harm to members of the traveling public, considering the foreseeability of
resulting injury. 20 The court also held that the furnishing of liquor may be
the proximate cause of injuries to third persons inflicted by an intoxicated
customer. 2' In determining liability the court used a "substantial factor"
test instead of a stricter proximate cause test. 22 Under the court's test the
furnishing of alcohol may be a proximate cause of a subsequent accident if
that act is a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. 23 The customer's alcohol consumption, resulting intoxication, and injury-producing
conduct are foreseeable intervening causes. 24 The Rappaport holding, however, was specifically limited25to a tavern owner who unlawfully served alcoholic beverages to a minor.
Rappaportmarked the beginning of a trend to impose liability on commer17. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
18. Rappaport was preceded by Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322, 326

(7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960), in which the court held that selling liquor to
intoxicated men was the proximate cause of an automobile collision. Although Waynick preceded Rappaport by a few months, Waynick was a federal court case, and the court did not
explain its reasoning. Rappaport, on the other hand, contained a more detailed decision and,

therefore, became the major precedent in the area of common law dram shop liability.
Holden, supra note 14, at 617.
19. 156 A.2d at 10.
20. Id. at 8; Holden, supra note 14, at 617-18.
21. 156 A,2d at 9; Holden, supra note 14, at 618. The proximate cause issue traditionally
had been the major obstacle to finding a cause of action based on social host liability. See
supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.

22. 156 A.2d at 9-10; see also Holden, supra note 14, at 618-19 (discussing significance of
Rappaport). An action is the proximate cause of a resulting occurrence if the result is reason-

ably foreseeable and the act is a substantial factor in causing the occurrence. W.

PROSSER,

LAW OF TORTS 248, 250 (4th ed. 1971).

23. 156 A.2d at 9-10. The New Jersey court relied on Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't
Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960), and several cases involving negligent entrustment, rather than cases involving alcoholic beverages. The court analogized the causation question posed in Rappaport to that in entrustment cases in which the
negligent conduct of the defendants contributed to the injury of innocent third persons. 156

A.2d at 7 and cases cited therein.
24.

156 A.2d at 9-10.

25. Id. at 10. In deciding to hold liquor licensees civilly liable, the court relied heavily on
the fact that the service of alcohol to a minor was in contravention of a statute and administrative regulation. Id. at 8, 10 (citing N.J. REV. STAT. § 33:1-77 (1939); Division of Alcoholic

Beverage Control, Reg. No. 20, R. 1); see also Holden, supra note 14, at 619 (discussing duty in
Rappaport as established by statute).
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cial suppliers of alcohol. 26 A substantial number of jurisdictions have concluded that the sale of alcohol by a commercial supplier may be the
proximate cause of injuries to third persons.27 Many other jurisdictions,
however, still maintain that an injured party has no cause of action against a
commercial supplier of alcohol absent a dram shop act. 28 Most courts have
given Rappaport a limited reading, requiring the existence of an alcoholic
beverage control statute that imposes duties on licensees regarding whom
29
they may serve as a prerequisite to applying a negligence analysis.
26. Holden, supra note 14, at 619 (noting significance of Rappaport as forerunner of subsequent cases imposing liability).
27. The following jurisdictions have asserted common law dram shop liability against
commercial suppliers: Alaska (Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671, 673 (Alaska 1981)); Arizona
(Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200, 204-05 (1983) (en banc)); California (Vesely
v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 158, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 626-27 (1971) (en banc) (abrogated by statute)); Colorado (Kerby v. Flamingo Club, Inc., 35 Colo. App. 127, 532 P.2d 975,
979 (1979)); Connecticut (Kowal v. Hoffer, 181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1, 3-4 (1980)); Delaware
(Taylor v. Ruiz, 394 A.2d 765, 768 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978)); District of Columbia (Marusa v.
District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1973)); Florida (Prevatt v. McClennan, 201
So. 2d 780, 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967)); Hawaii (Ono v. Applegate, 62 Hawaii 131, 612
P.2d 533, 537 (1980)); Idaho (Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980));
Indiana (Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847, 849 (1966)); Iowa (Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225, 225-26 (Iowa 1982)); Kentucky (Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626, 629
(Ky. 1968)); Louisiana (Thrasher v. Leggett, 373 So. 2d 494, 497 (La. 1979); Pence v.
Ketchum, 326 So. 2d 831, 835 (La. 1976)); Maryland (Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d
494, 499 (1981)); Massachusetts (Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 493, 233 N.E.2d 18,
20 (1967)); Michigan (Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820, 824 (1973) (when
civil damage act inapplicable)); Minnesota (Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d
618, 624 (1973) (when civil damage act inapplicable)); Mississippi (Munford, Inc. v. Peterson,
368 So. 2d 213, 217-18 (Miss. 1979)); Missouri (Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570, 574-75
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983)); Montana (Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348, 361 (D. Mont.
1969)); New Hampshire (Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900, 901 (1965)); New
Jersey (Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 8-9 (1959)); New York (Vale v. Yawarski, 79 Misc. 2d 320, 359 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (1974)); North Carolina (Hutchison v. Hawkins,
63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584, 586 (1983)); Ohio (Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 294
N.E.2d 884, 887 (1973)); Oregon (Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P,2d 18, 21 (1971) (en banc)); Pennsylvania (Jardine v. Upper Darby
Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550, 552 (1964)); Tennessee (Mitchell v. Ketner,
54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755, 759 (1964)); Washington (Young v. Caravan Corp., 99
Wash. 2d 655, 663 P.2d 834, 837-38 (1983) (en banc)).
28. The following states disallow a cause of action absent application of a dram shop act:
Arkansas (Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656, 657 (1965)); Delaware (Wright v.
Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554, 557-59 (Del. 1981)); Florida (Barber v. Jensen, 428 So. 2d 770, 771 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Lone Star Florida, Inc. v. Cooper, 409 So. 2d 758, 759-60 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982)); Illinois (Gustafson v. Matthews, 109 Ill. App. 3d 884, 441 N.E.2d 388, 391
(1982)); Nebraska (Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65, 70 (1976)); Nevada
(Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358, 360 (1969)); New Mexico (Hall
v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71, 73 (1966)); Wisconsin (Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d
483, 280 N.W.2d 178, 180 (1979), rev'd sub nom. Sorensen ex rel. Kerscher v. Jarvis, 119 Wis.
2d 627, 359 N.W.2d 108 (1984)).
29. Holden, supra note 14, at 619-20. A dram shop act creates civil liability against the
seller of alcohol for injuries resulting from a drinker's intoxication, but an alcoholic beverage
control statute simply regulates the sale and distribution of alcohol to individuals who represent a high risk, such as minors or intoxicated persons, with no accompanying liability for
injuries. Graham, supra note 7, at 569. All states and the District of Columbia have enacted
alcoholic beverage control statutes. See Graham, supra note 7, at 569-70 n.42 (listing alcohol
control provisions of all states and District of Columbia, as of 1980). Absent a duty no cause
of action is available under a traditional negligence analysis. See infra note 62 for an explanation of the traditional negligence analysis and the significance of duty thereunder.
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In Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc. 30 the New Jersey Supreme Court
appeared to ratify a restricted reading of Rappaportwhile extending the concept of dram shop liability. The Soronen court held that a cause of action
3
existed against a tavern owner for serving alcohol to an intoxicated adult. '
Although the court used a traditional negligence analysis, it relied heavily on
32
an alcoholic beverage control statute to establish the tavern keeper's duty.
The Soronen court also established a balancing test for evaluating proximate
cause and negligence. 3 3 Although the court may have read Rappaport restrictively, the decision affected the development of New Jersey law by extending Rappaportbeyond the serving of alcohol to minors to the serving of
alcohol to adults. 34 Despite the extension by the Soronen court, the Rappaport holding remained somewhat limited because the duty that the court
imposed stemmed from existing regulations that prohibited only licensees
35
from serving alcohol to minors or intoxicated adults.
A broad reading of Rappaport and Soronen makes the extension of common law dram shop liability to include the social host appear to be a logical
progression. The legal issues of causation and negligence with respect to the
commercial supplier of alcohol are identical to those issues with respect to
the social host; however, courts have refused a concurrent extension of liability to social hosts. 36 The Appellate Division of New Jersey, for example,
exemplified the reluctance of courts to expose the social host to common law
dram shop liability in Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn, Inc. 37 In Anslinger a
corporation held a quasi-business meeting on the premises of a licensed liquor dealer, the Martinsville Inn. Alcoholic beverages were provided for
those in attendance. Anslinger, an adult who became voluntarily intoxicated
at the meeting, was subsequently involved in a fatal automobile crash. Anslinger's wife sought to hold the corporation, as social host, to the same
standard as a licensed commercial supplier of alcohol. 38 The court reaffirmed the holdings of Rappaport and Soronen and held that the inn was
30. 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630, 636 (1966).
31, 218 A.2d at 636.

32. Id. at 633, 636. For an explanation of a traditional negligence analysis, see infra note
62.
33. 218 A.2d at 636. Since New Jersey did not have a dram shop act that fixed the scope
and extent of the tavern keeper's liability, the court concluded that the common law principles
of negligence and proximate causation were applicable. Id. In applying these principles the

court recognized that, as in Rappaport, "the balancing of the conflicting interests and the
weighing of the policy considerations are the vital factors." Id.
34. Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 525, 298 A.2d 84, 87 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, 62 N.J. 334 (1973).
35. 218 A.2d at 633.
36. Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507, 510 (Pa. 1983) (most courts retain old common law
rule that the consumption of alcohol, not the furnishing of it, is the proximate cause of any
subsequent occurrence); see Holden, supra note 14, at 621 (citing cases); Graham, supra note 7,
at 562-63 (citing cases). Contra Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15, 18 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1976) ("It makes little sense to say that the licensee in Rappaport is under a duty
to exercise care, but give immunity to a social host who may be guilty of the same wrongful
conduct merely because he is unlicensed.").
37. 121 N.J. Super. 525, 298 A.2d 84 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972), cert. denied, 62 N.J.
334 (1973).
38. 298 A.2d at 88.
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negligent as a licensed supplier of alcohol. 39 The court refused, however, to
expand liability to encompass nonlicensees. 4°
The liability of alcohol suppliers in other jurisdictions was developing concurrently with the change in New Jersey law. A major development applying to social hosts occurred in Oregon. In 1971 Oregon's supreme court

became the first court to break the nonlicensee barrier and to impose liability
on a social host in Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity.4' The court in Wiener held that a fraternity may be liable to third
parties under general principles of negligence for serving alcohol to a minor.4 2 The court imposed liability under a pure negligence theory and rejected the theory of negligence per se, 4 3 or statutory delineation of duty,
based on a violation of the minority drinking laws.44 Oregon's legislature
was apparently uncomfortable with the potentially limitless application of
the court's decision, because the legislature amended the law by limiting the
possible causes of action to service of alcohol to minors or intoxicated persons. 45 Although Wiener was the forerunner in social host liability, the decision could be limited by its facts as applying only to the service, by social
46
hosts, of alcohol to minors.
The Appellate Division of New Jersey finally extended liability to a social
host in 1976 in Linn v. Rand.4 7 Linn was similar to Rappaport and Wiener,
because Linn involved a minor who was served alcoholic beverages and subsequently became involved in a motor vehicle accident. The court refused to
follow jurisdictions that had rejected social host liability, but, rather, chose
to extend the rationale of Rappaport beyond the nonlicensee barrier to the
social host.48 Although the court extended the standard applicable to a li39. Id.
40. Id. at 87, 88.
41. 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21-22 (1971).
42. 485 P.2d at 22; see Graham, supra note 7, at 576-77 (discussing Wiener holding);
Note, Chapter 801: Commercial and Social Host Liability For Dispensing Alcoholic Beverages,
16 WILLAMET-rE L. REV. 191, 200 (1980) (discussing Wiener).
43. Negligence per se results from the violation of a public duty, which is enjoined by law
for the protection of persons or property. 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 9 (1971).
44. 485 P.2d at 21-22. The significance of the court's rejection of statutorily defined duty
is that the court did not limit its holding only to those situations covered by statute as did the
courts in Rappaport and Soronen. See supra notes 25, 32, and accompanying texts.
45. See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.955 (1981); see also Graham, supra note 7, at 572-73 (discussing negligence per se as basis for social host liability); Holden, supra note 14, at 627-29
(same); Note, supra note 42, at 195 (same).
46. 485 P.2d at 21-22. Since Wiener other courts have imposed liability for the service of
intoxicants to minors. See, e.g., Burke v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 570, 181 Cal. Rptr.
149 (1980); Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974); Thaut v. Finley, 50
Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973).
47. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
48. 356 A.2d at 17-18; see supra note 36 and accompanying text. The implications of
extending civil liability to social hosts for the subsequent negligent acts of intoxicated adults
are far-reaching. Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (Sup. Ct. 1975)
(extending liability to nonsellers would open Pandora's box), affid, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389
N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976). Important considerations in making the extension are: (1) the expectation that a private individual possesses the same knowledge and experience as a liquor licensee
in determining levels and degrees of intoxication; (2) the fairness of requiring the average individual both to detect a guest's level of intoxication and to determine the effect that another
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quor licensee to a social host, the Linn case could be limited to the special
considerations that apply to minors. 49 Consonant with that limitation, the
jurisdictions that have imposed common law liability at the appellate level
on social hosts
have done so only in cases involving the furnishing of alcohol
50
to minors.
In 1982 a New Jersey trial court ignored these precedents and held a social host liable for furnishing alcohol to an obviously intoxicated adult in
Figuly v. Knoll.5' The court traced the development of social host liability,
citing Rappaport, Soronen, and Linn and distinguishing Anslinger.5 2 The

court concluded that a social host was liable for injuries to third parties
resulting from the negligent acts of an intoxicated guest, who was furnished
53
liquor by the host.
One year later, in Kelly v. Gwinnell, the Appellate Division of New Jersey

ignored Figuly and held that a cause of action did not exist against a social
host who furnished alcohol to his adult guest for damages resulting from the
guest's intoxication. 54 The appellate division relied on recent rulings in
other jurisdictions that required legislative action before a social host could
be held liable for serving alcohol to intoxicated adult guests. 55 On appeal the
drink would have on that person; and (3) the extent to which the social host must act to avoid
liability. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d at 1233-34. Another pertinent question is whether the
social host has the duty to control his guests' movements and behavior. Edgar v. Kajet, 375
N.Y.S.2d at 552; see Winter, Social Host Liabilityfor FurnishingAlcohol. A Legal Hangover?,
10 PAC. L.J. 95, 95 (1978).
49. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 463 A.2d at 389-90.
50. Id.; Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507, 509 (Pa. 1983) (no cause of action against host
that served adult guest); see Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515, 517-18 (Pa. 1983)
(companion case to Klein v. Raysinger) (social host negligent per se for causing minor's intoxication); see also Annot., 97 A.L.R.3D 528, 538 (1980) (discussing liability of suppliers of alcohol). Although a cause of action for serving an intoxicated adult may exist in Oregon, it is
based on statute and not common law. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Both the
Iowa and Minnesota legislatures have abrogated holdings by their courts that allowed social
hosts to be held liable under dram shop legislation. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying
text. The California legislature similarly imposed strict legislative guidelines on the California
courts, expressly reversing prior decisions holding social hosts liable. CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1979); see Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 150-52,
577 P.2d 669, 671-72, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 537-38 (1978) (imposing social host liability for
service to adult); Bernard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 324-25, 345 P.2d 719, 726-27, 128
Cal. Rptr. 215, 222 (1976) (recognizing social host liability); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 25602, 25602.1 (West Supp. 1979) (expressly abrogating holdings in Coulter v. Superior
Court and Bernard v. Harrah'sClub). See generally Holden, supra note 14, at 623-31 (discussing the impact of Coulter v. Superior Court); Note, Intoxicating Liquor-PersonsLiable-A
Social Host Who Furnishes Alcoholic Beverages to an Obviously Intoxicated Person May Be
Held Accountable to Third Persons Who Are ForeseeablyInjured, 55 N.D.L. REv. 289 (1979)
(discussing the holding in Coulter v. Superior Court).
51. 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564, 565 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
52. 449 A.2d at 564-65.
53. Id. The court found no reasonable basis for limiting the application of Linn to minors.
Id.
54. 463 A.2d at 390.
55. Id. The court disagreed with assertions that a nationwide judicial trend existed toward
the extension of liability to social hosts. Id. Many courts have denied the extension of civil
liability absent legislative enactment. See, e.g., Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp., 460 F. Supp. 80, 82
(D.D.C. 1978); Heldt v, Brei, 118 Ill. App. 3d 798, 455 N.E.2d 842, 844 (1983); Miller v.
Moran, 96 Il. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (1981); Hamm v. Carson City Nugget,
Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358, 359 (1969); Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71, 74
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New Jersey Supreme Court had to resolve the conflict between the New
Jersey decisions and decide whether to extend liability to a social host for
serving alcohol to an adult.
II.

KELLY V. GWINNELL

The sole issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in Kelly v. Gwinnell
was whether a social host who supplied intoxicating beverages to a guest
could be held responsible to third persons for the negligent acts of that intoxicated guest. The court used traditional common law negligence principles
to resolve the issue. 56 The crucial determination in the court's negligence
analysis was whether a social host has a duty to protect third persons from
the risks presented by an intoxicated guest.57 The court first determined
whether a duty actually existed to prevent such a risk and then decided
whether such a duty should be imposed on a policy basis.5 8 The court imposed a duty on the social host in this case, 59 but emphasized that the imposition of a duty and social host liability to third persons as a result of the
actions of intoxicated guests must be determined by evaluating the unique
facts of each particular case. 60 The court expressly limited the imposition of
a duty on the social host to situations in which the host served the guest
injuries resulted from the guest's drunken
directly and the third person's
61
driving of an automobile.
The majority used a traditional negligence analysis to determine whether a
social supplier of intoxicating beverages could be liable to a third person for
the negligent acts of an intoxicated guest. 62 A social host is negligent, the
majority concluded, if he provides liquor to a guest with the knowledge that
(1966); Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897, 900 (1969) (en
bane). But see Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wash. App. 84, 678 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1984) (refusing to
follow Halvorson).
56. 476 A.2d at 1221-22. In doing so the court refused to allow either the absence of
decisions in this country imposing such liability or the presence of decisions indicating that
such an imposition of liability is a legislative function to influence its decision. Id. at 1221,
1228-29.
57. Id. at 1222. Absent a recognized duty requiring the social host to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of third persons against unreasonable risks, no
cause of action can exist. See W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 143 (listing duty as requisite
element of negligence action).
58. 476 A.2d at 1222.
59. Id. at 1224. In a six-to-one decision the court held the guest liable with the social host
as joint tortfeasors, but left open the questions of contribution and indemnity. Id. at 1236.
60. Id. at 1228. The court advocated the use of the same balancing test used in Kelly to
make future case-by-case evaluations of duty. Id.
61. Id. at 1230.
62. Id. at 1221. The traditional formula necessary for a negligence cause of action requires: (1) a legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct protecting others against unreasonable risks; (2) a breach of that duty by a failure to conform to the given standard of
conduct, which involves a foreseeable risk, a threatened danger of injury, and conduct unreasonable in proportion to the danger; (3) a reasonably close causal connection between the
negligent conduct and the resulting injury, or "proximate cause"; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 143, 244, 250.
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the guest must drive home. 63 Negligence is not actionable, however, unless a
legally cognizable duty exists.64 The duty question, therefore, was pivotal in
the court's determination of social host liability. 65 The first question that the
court addressed in its examination of duty was whether a duty currently
existed under New Jersey law to protect against the risk presented when a
social host furnishes alcoholic beverages to his guests. While noting that a
duty had not been recognized explicitly in New Jersey, the court concluded
that the imposition of a duty to prevent such risks was a logical extension of
66
prior decisions.
The court discussed the progression of the social host cases, beginning
with the landmark decision of Rappaport v. Nichols.67 The Kelly court reasoned that the significance of Rappaportwas the imposition on a licensee of a
duty to members of the general public based on principles of common law
negligence. 68 The next judicial extension of this duty occurred in Soronen v.

Olde Milford Inn, Inc. 69 The significance of Soronen, the court stated, was
its extension of the licensee's duty to the adult customer. 70 The majority
noted that the situation of the licensee and the social host are clearly distinguishable; however, the court ignored those distinctions and focused on the
presence in Soronen of underlying considerations common to those relied on
72
to dispute liability in Kelly. 7 1 Finally, the court considered Linn v. Rand
73
to be a major step in the progression of New Jersey law. The Kelly court
63. 476 A.2d at 1221-22. The court's analysis shows a fair adherence to the traditional
negligence principles. Id. at 1222.

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The court determined that social host duty and liability logically extended from

Soronen, Linn, and Rappaport. In each of those cases the social considerations, which invest
the host with immunity, were virtually identical to those present in Kelly. Id. at 1222-23. The
court expressly disavowed social host immunity as not being the "inevitable result of the law of
negligence." Id. at 1221. Although it rejected social host immunity, the court did not discuss
its reasoning, but chose to focus on the question of duty. Id. at 1222-26. No immunity for
social hosts can be found in New Jersey case law. See Linn, 356 A.2d at 18. Legislative
attempts to halt the rising tide of traffic accidents caused by drunk drivers, however, pervade
New Jersey's statutory law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1-1 to -4 (West Supp. 1984-1985); N.J.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 13 (1984).
67. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
68. 476 A.2d at 1222-23. While focusing on the use of negligence principles, the court
failed to discuss the limiting language of Rappaport: "[T]he allegations of the complaint are
expressly confined to tavern keepers' sales and service which are unlawful and negligent. Liquor licensees, who operate their businesses by way of privilege rather than as of right, have
long been under strict obligation not to serve minors and intoxicated persons ....
" Rappaport, 156 A.2d at 10. The Kelly court also failed to discuss the issue of the age of the
consumer of alcoholic beverages.
69. 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
70. 476 A.2d at 1223. The court in Soronen, however, relied upon an alcohol control
administrative regulation to establish a duty rather than principles of common law negligence.
Soronen, 218 A.2d at 633; see supra notes 25, 29, and accompanying texts for an explanation of
the relationship between alcohol control statutes and duty.
71. 476 A.2d at 1223. The distinctions between a licensee and a social host are not insignificant. See id. at 1233-35 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (discussing important distinctions between licensee and social host); supra note 48 and accompanying text (distinguishing between
licensee and social host).
72. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
73. 476 A.2d at 1223 (citing Linn, 356 A.2d at 15).
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emphasized that almost all of the considerations urged against liability in
Kelly were manifest in Linn. 74 The Kelly court failed to address, however,
the significant distinctions between the service of alcohol to a minor and
service to an adult. 7 5 Nevertheless, noting the limitations explicit in Rappaport, the Kelly court approved Linn's extension of liability to social
hosts.

76

Having justified social host liability in light of prior decisions, the New
Jersey Supreme Court then addressed the propriety of imposing a duty on a
social supplier of alcoholic beverages. The court recognized the existence of
a duty as ultimately resting on a question of fairness. 77 The court introduced a balancing test to support the imposition of a duty on the social host
to protect third parties from injury as a result of a guest's drunken driving. 78
The balancing requires a comparison on a case-by-case basis of public policy
considerations that support the duty with societal interest in opposition to a
duty. 79 The majority weighed the assurance of just compensation to the victims of drunk drivers, along with the deterrent effect of such a rule, against
the relatively trivial
consideration of interference with accepted standards of
80
social behavior.
The supreme court supported its balancing test and resulting imposition of
social host duty by analogizing social host liability to the liability traditionally imposed for negligent entrustment of one's car to a person known to be
intoxicated .8 The court emphasized that the goals sought to be achieved by
the imposition of a duty on the host supported liability as a matter of policy.8 2 The goals sought to be achieved by the court were the fair compensa74. 476 A.2d at 1223. Some of the factors that the court considered to favor a finding
against liability in Kelly, and that were present in Linn, include: (1) the causal events began in
a social setting, not a tavern; (2) the provider of alcoholic beverages was a host, not a licensee;
and (3) all of the traditional notions of fault and causation that might place sole responsibility
on the intoxicated driver were present. Id.
75. Id. But see Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507, 510-11 (Pa. 1983), and Congini v.
Portersville Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515, 517-18 (Pa. 1983) (companion cases) (holding distinction

between serving alcohol to minor and serving alcohol to adult significant).
76. 476 A.2d at 1223. By expressly approving Linn, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
impliedly rejected the rationale evidenced in Anslinger that social host liability would be a
departure from the policy expressed in Rappaport. See Anslinger, 298 A.2d at 88. Contrary to
Anslinger, the Kelly court expressed that Linn was merely the fair implication of Rappaport
and Soronen. 476 A.2d at 1223, 1224; see also id. at 1224 n.8 (noting inconsistency with

Anslinger but not overruling it).
77. 476 A.2d at 1224. A determination of what is fair requires a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution.
Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962); accord Portee v. Jaffee, 84
N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (1980) (advocating weighing process to determine duty).
78. 476 A.2d at 1224, 1228.
79. Id. at 1228. The majority suggested that a weighing process would be applied in the

future. Id.
80. Id. at 1224. The court apparently concluded that any imposition on social standards
of behavior as a result of social host duty would be nugatory at best.
81. Id. at 1224. The court cited old cases from other jurisdictions, specifically, California,
Georgia, Kansas, Nebraska, and Washington, in support of this argument. Id. The court's
argument parallels the negligent entrustment discussion present in Rappaport. See Rappaport,
156 A.2d at 7.
82. 476 A.2d at 1226.
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tion of victims who are injured by drunken driving, the deterrence of
drunken driving, and the motivation of hosts to take greater care when serv83
ing alcoholic beverages at social functions.
The court next considered whether a duty could exist as an instrument of
judicial creation.8 4 While recognizing that practically every other jurisdiction that had addressed this question had concluded otherwise, the court
held that the issue of social host duty was proper for judicial determination.8 5 The court stated that imposing a duty on social hosts was simply
defining the scope of duty in a negligence case, a traditional function of the
judiciary.8 6 The judiciary had been significantly involved in resolving similar issues in Rappaport,Soronen, Figuly, and Linn, and those decisions remained unaltered by the legislature. The court, therefore, reasoned that the
legislature had implicitly accepted judicial determination of liability for furnishers of intoxicating beverages to those who later drive. 87 Since the legislature had not rejected the prior decisions, from which Kelly logically
extended, the court concluded that the legislature implicitly approved the
role of the judiciary in this situation. 8 If the legislature disagrees with the
court, the legislature can reverse the court's decision. 89
The dissent argued that judicial resolution of the social host duty question
could drastically affect the average citizen and, therefore, the legislature
should determine social host liability. 90 In response the majority asserted
several reasons why its ruling would not have an extraordinary impact on
83. Id. Although the court did not assure that the imposition of liability would significantly affect the attainment of these goals, the court suggested that the dire need to control
drunk driving more than adequately justified the lack of assurance. Id. The social cost of
drunken driving in New Jersey accentuated the need for a solution. The societal cost for New
Jersey alcohol-related highway deaths for the period from 1978 to 1982 was estimated to be as
high as $1.15 billion, based on information obtained from the New Jersey Division of Motor
Vehicles. New Jersey reported a high of 376 drunken driving deaths in 1981. Id. at 1222, 1226
n.11.
84. Id. at 1226-28. This issue of legislative or judicial responsibility was the thrust of the
dissent. Id. at 1230 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). See infra notes 98-112 and accompanying text
(discussing dissent).
85. Id. at 1226, 1228-29. The majority of jurisdictions that have faced this issue have
considered the imposition of social host duty to third persons a matter for legislative, not
judicial, resolution. See, e.g., Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp., 460 F. Supp. 80, 82 (D.D.C. 1978)
(holding social host duty is legislative question); Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 421
N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (1981) (social host duty is legislative question); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb.
496, 244 N.W.2d 65, 70 (1976) (social host duty is legislative question); Hamm v. Carson City
Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358, 359 (1969) (social host duty is legislative question);
Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 236, 310 A.2d 75, 76 (1973) (declining to extend liability to nonlicensed suppliers of alcoholic beverages because a decision of such magnitude "is best left to the
legislature"); Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178, 181 (1979) (both social host
duty and vendor duty are legislative questions), rev'd sub nom. Sorensen ex rel. Kerscher v.
Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 359 N.W.2d 108, 119 (1984). But see Coulter v. Superior Court, 21
Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978) (judicial creation of social host liability)
(abrogated by statute).
86. 476 A.2d at 1226.
87. Id. at 1227-28.
88. Id. at 1227. The cases cited by the court illustrate that the legislature had abrogated
judicial decisions before when the courts had gone too far. Id. at 1227-28.
89. Id. at 1227.
90. Id. at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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the average citizen: (1) homeowner's insurance was available to the social
host and would cover the liability created in Kelly; (2) society had realized
that it must change its habits, and as a result, hosts had already begun to
monitor their guests' drinking to some extent; (3) the result in Kelly was
required to increase the likelihood of compensation for the innocent victims
of drunken driving; and (4) extending liability to social hosts would provide
added deterrence against drunken driving. 9 1 Applying the balancing test,
the court said that any impact on the average citizen could not be extraordinary relative to the tremendous social costs of drunken driving. 92 For example, the extraordinary financial losses suffered by society as a result of
drunken driving would far outweigh the financial impact of an insurance
premium increase on the homeowner or tenant. 93 The suffering and death
that the drunken driver causes outweigh the burden placed on the social host
to oversee the serving of liquor, the burden on the guests to make certain
that if one is drinking another is driving, and the burden on all to take rea94
sonable steps even though the guest may become belligerent.
Consistent with the contention that an evaluation of the unique facts and
circumstances of each case must determine the existence of the social host's
duty to third persons, the New Jersey court strictly limited its holding in
Kelly to the facts before the court. 95 A social host's duty to third persons
only arises in situations in which the host directly served a guest and the
injuries to the third person resulted from the guest's drunken driving of an
automobile. 96 Although the court limited its holding ostensibly to filter out
baseless claims, the majority's advocacy of the balancing test and its inclination to impose social host liability caused the dissent to suggest that the
scales may often tip in favor of social host liability, even though the facts of a
97
case fall outside the limitations imposed in Kelly.
While supportive of stricter measures to deter drunken driving, the dissent
concluded that the legislature could more effectively achieve the majority's
goals of compensating victims and deterring drunken driving without saddling the average citizen with such an onerous burden. 98 The legislature's
special knowledge and ability to investigate the issue thoroughly made the
legislature more qualified to decide whether to impose liability. 99 The dissent
concurred in the majority's approval of Linn, but only to the extent that
91. Id. at 1227.
92. Id. at 1229.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1230.
96. Id. The court limited the imposition of duty to automobile accidents because they are
routinely thoroughly investigated and, thereby, furnish clear objective evidence establishing
intoxication and the cause of the accident. Id.
97. Id. at 1232-34 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); accord Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375
N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (suggesting imposition of social host liability would have

limitless ramifications), aff'd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976).
98. 476 A.2d at 1230-33 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). This burden includes the possibility
that homeowners' insurance policies would not cover liability against social hosts, resulting in
catastrophic loss to individual social hosts. Id. at 1234-35.
99. Id. at 1235-36.
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Linn applied to social hosts who serve liquor to minors.' °° While many
other jurisdictions had considered the social host duty issue prior to Kelly,
no jurisdiction had established a duty against a social host for serving alcoholic beverages to an adult. 10 ' A majority of courts, the dissent noted, con10 2
cur with the view that the issue is properly left to the legislature.
The dissent downplayed the majority's concern for the compensation of
victims of drunken driving, opining that victims were adequately compensated absent social host liability.' 0 3 A New Jersey law requires motorists to
have uninsured motorist coverage." ° 4 In addition, if a drunk driver strikes
and injures an uninsured pedestrian and the pedestrian cannot obtain satisfaction from a judgment against the drunken driver, the pedestrian can satisfy the judgment out of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund. 0 5
The dissent noted the dissimilarity between licensees and social hosts and
concluded that the majority created problems by refusing to distinguish between the two with respect to liability for furnishing alcoholic beverages. 0 6
Licensed, commercial suppliers are experienced in the business of selling liquor and deal with the public every day; however, a social host is not experienced and may have more difficulty in determining levels and degrees of
intoxication. 0 7 A social host also does not have the control over the liquor
that a commercial bartender has.' 0 8 The social host often drinks with his
guests; the more the host drinks the less able he will be to determine when a
guest is intoxicated. 0 9 As a practical matter, by virtue of the detached nature of the relationship, a commercial distributor is in a better position to
refuse to serve a customer or request that he leave. A social host, however,
is faced with potentially intense social and personal ramifications when he
must tell his boss, client, friend, neighbor, or family member that he believes
that person is intoxicated and cannot handle another drink. 10
The dissent also expressed concern with the implicit assumption that if a
social host has a duty to third persons, then he must have a concurrent abil100. Id. at 1230 n.l. The dissent noted that the distinction between serving alcohol to a
minor and to an adult was clearly expressed in legislative policy. Id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 33:1-77 (West Supp. 1984-1985). That legislative policy, coupled with the fact that minors
occupy a special place in society and traditionally have been protected by state regulation from
the consequences of their own immaturity, suggests a basis for Linn absent legislative determination. Accord Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507, 509-10 (Pa. 1983) (disallowing social host
liability for service to adult); Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515, 517-18 (Pa.
1983) (allowing social host liability for service to minor).
101. 476 A.2d at 1221 n.2.
102. Id. at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); see supra note 85 and accompanying text (compilation of jurisdictions so holding).
103. 476 A.2d at 1232-33.
104. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-14,(West 1973).
105. Id. §§ 39:6-64 to -73 (West 1973 & Supp. 1984-1985) (providing, subject to certain
limitations, that unsatisfied judgments can be paid from the fund).
106. 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1234. In a commercial setting a bartender or waitress serves the guest a drink,
but in a social setting guests frequently serve themselves or are served by other guests. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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ity to control the movements and behavior of the intoxicated guests. II This
assumption raises important questions of other tortious conduct, such as
false imprisonment or assault and battery, in which a social host may attempt physically to restrain an intoxicated guest from leaving. Finally, the
dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the legislature could
reverse the majority's decision if it disagreed with the imposition of social
host liability. 1 12

III.

CONCLUSION

After the court's decision in Kelly New Jersey became the only jurisdiction in the United States to recognize a cause of action against a social host
for the negligence of an intoxicated adult guest. While the majority claimed
that Kelly was a logical extension of prior decisions and purported to limit
its holding to the facts of the case, Kelly was actually a sizeable step in logic
in New Jersey case law. Prior to Kelly the New Jersey Supreme Court had
never explicitly recognized a cause of action against a social host, and lower
courts had not concurred on the existence of that cause of action. When
Kelly adopted the holding in Linn, with its crossing over the nonlicensee
barrier for serving alcohol to minors, and expanded that holding to include
service to adult guests, New Jersey advanced to the forefront in the area of
liability against suppliers of alcohol for the first time since Rappaport.
Kelly can be interpreted broadly or narrowly. Read narrowly Kelly restricts the imposition of social host duty to its express limitations. No cause
of action, therefore, could exist outside the bounds of these limitations, and
the impact of Kelly would be minimal. Read broadly Kelly would have a
significant impact and almost limitless application. Social host liability
would be imposed in any situation in which the balancing test indicated a
weighting in favor of a duty.
The future effect of Kelly largely depends on the legislative response to it.
If the New Jersey legislature abrogates or modifies the outcome of Kelly, a
clear message would emanate to courts that the imposition of duty on social
hosts is a matter for legislative determination. If the legislature does not
respond, however, the message to courts will be equally clear, signaling tacit
approval of judicial determination of the social host duty question. The decision in Kelly, therefore, ultimately places the question of social host duty
upon the shoulders of the body that the Kelly dissent asserted is most adequately equipped to resolve it, the legislature.
C. Kent Adams

111. Id. The majority opinion does not indicate how far a social host must go to avoid
liability.
112. Id. at 1235.

